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UNVEILING THE EXPECTED LOSS MODEL IN IFRS 9 AND CIRCULAR 4/2017 
 
 
As a result of the Great Financial Crisis, the G-20 requested that the accounting standard 
setters change the model for estimation of credit losses (or “provisions”). Following this 
mandate, the “expected loss” model replaced the “incurred loss” model in order to favor a 
more timely and adequate estimation of credit losses. We explain that, from a conceptual 
perspective, the expected loss model may help to achieve this goal because it requires 
credit losses to be recognized from the origination of the transaction and the level of 
provisions to be increased when the credit quality of the transaction worsens but it has not 
defaulted. The scant data available so far seem to confirm these conceptual insights. Some 
criticisms of the expected loss model allude to its pro-cyclicality, without considering that an 
efficient accounting standard should not repress volatility, by giving a false image of stability, 
as the incurred loss model did. The expected loss model allows for greater subjectivity in its 
application, but this subjectivity must be understood in a positive manner so as to anticipate 
more accurately future credit losses, not leaving room for earnings management practices. 
We campaign for an adequate implementation of the standard as an essential tool to achieve 
the objectives of all stakeholders (preparers, auditors, regulators and supervisors).
In the undertow of the global financial crisis in 2008, G-20 leaders asked for to change the 
“incurred loss model” in International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39), which they 
criticized as a “too little and too late” recognition of credit losses. To overcome this 
inefficiency, International Financial Reporting Standard 9 (IFRS 9) introduced a new 
accounting impairment framework based on an “expected loss” model.
Financial reports seek to provide useful information to a large number of users, investors 
being the primary users. In this regard, it is crucial to underpin the objective, usefulness 
and limitations of financial reporting gathered under the IFRS Conceptual Framework. 
For accounting standard setters, as commented by Hoogervorst (2017), their primary goal 
is to develop standards that bring transparency, accountability and efficiency to financial 
markets. In doing so, they encourage not only trust and growth, but they also support the 
long-term financial stability of the global economy. However, fostering financial stability is 
not the primary aim of accounting standards. It is primarily the remit of prudential regulators 
and supervisors, whose task is to safeguard the solvency of the financial system.
It could be argued that the incurred loss model led to adverse effects on the relevance of 
financial information and on financial stability. These adverse effects are a manifestation of 
“the great turkey problem” posed by Taleb (2012).1 A turkey is fed regularly by a butcher; 
every day that passes, the turkey confirms “with increased statistical confidence” that 
the grain is delivered by the butcher in due course; until a day before Christmas Eve2 when the 
butcher not only does not feed the turkey but dispatches it to the poultry store. The turkey 
uses evidence, ignores Christmas Eve, and makes future projections based on the past.
“The great turkey problem” illustrates critical deficiencies in risk management practices, 
the most important deficiency is the fragility of the modelling of non-linear damaging 
1 Nassin Nicholas Taleb is famous for developing the “Black Swan” Theory.
2 In Taleb’s (2012) example the crucial day is Thanksgiving. The authors have used Christmas Eve to make it easier 
to understand by readers outside the USA.
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phenomena relying only on historical information: volatility is smoothed to create the 
illusion of stability (not real stability) with devastating consequences when the repressed 
volatility is released. In short, the danger arises from the belief that the system is safe 
derived from an unbridled confidence in models based on historical data, which exclude 
events that have not occurred yet and compress volatility. 
From the accounting point of view, it became clear that the incurred loss model gave too 
much leeway to banks to postpone recognizing inevitable loan losses for too long. 
Nevertheless, as Giner and Mora (2016) pointed out, some voices argued that during the 
recent financial crisis the “too little and too late” problem could have been avoided, at least 
partly, if the incurred loss model had been applied much more vigorously. 
The principal standard setters – the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) – fulfilled the mandate from the G-20 
and issued respectively: IFRS 9 in July 2014 and ASC 326 in June 2016. In the European 
context, IFRS 9 was incorporated into the European Union (EU) regulatory framework in 
November 2016 (“endorsed” in the EU jargon) and became mandatory from 1 January 
2018 onwards. Whilst the American standard is expected to come into force on 15 
December 2019 for “SEC filers” (institutions that are required to make regular submissions 
of financial information to the Securities and Exchange Commission) and on 15 December 
2020 for other institutions.
IFRS 9 supersedes IAS 39 and amends it in two fundamental areas: the classification 
criteria for measurement purposes of financial assets and the introduction of an expected 
credit loss approach for the estimation of credit losses. In this context, following 
Hoogervorst (2018), IFRS 9 should have a preventative effect, because it will lead to a 
much quicker crystallization of loan losses and will contribute to an improvement of credit 
quality control systems in the banking industry. Besides, timely loan loss recognition will 
promote more prudent dividend distribution and remuneration policies.
According to Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, all issuers of listed securities, regardless of their 
sector of activity, must apply the IFRSs endorsed by the EU (IFRS-EU) in the preparation 
of their public consolidated accounts. This Regulation leaves it to the discretion of each 
Member State to choose from the following options for the preparation of the consolidated 
accounts of the unlisted entities and the individual accounts: 
– require the application of IFRS-EU; 
– develop a national accounting standard or National GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles); or 
– allow entities to choose between the above two options consistently. 
In Spain, under Article 43 bis of the Commercial Code, unlisted groups can choose 
between the two options (IFRS-EU or National GAAP) for the consolidated accounts; and, 
for the individual accounts, the sectoral accounting standard setter has developed a 
national accounting framework.
The Banco de España, in the exercise of its competences as a sectoral standard setter 
bestowed by Law 5/2014, issues mandatory accounting standards (“Circulars”) with the 
scope discussed above. Since 2004, given the adoption of IFRS by the EU, the Banco de 
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España has followed a strategy based on aligning its accounting standards with the IFRS 
as adopted by the EU (IFRS-EU). Thus, by applying Spanish standards, international 
standards will also be applied.
Pursuant to the principle of effectiveness, by aligning Spanish GAAP for credit institutions 
with IFRS-EU, the Banco de España avoids the burden arising from the co-existence of 
two different accounting frameworks which are applicable to the same credit institution.
Furthermore, the application of compatible accounting frameworks at both individual and 
consolidated level makes it easier for the users of financial reporting, including the Banco 
de España, as well as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), to analyze and understand credit institutions’ financial position and 
performance.
Finally, this strategy of alignment with IFRS-EU allows accounting developments at EU 
level to be incorporated promptly into Spanish GAAP for credit institutions. In this way, the 
quality of the Spanish GAAPs for credit institutions is comparable to that of the “benchmark” 
European Framework.
In the area of estimation of credit losses, the Circular, specifically Annex 9, incorporates 
additional guidance aimed at increasing the consistency of outcomes across Spanish 
institutions.
The next section includes a general scheme of the valuation of financial assets in IFRS 9 
and Annex 9. Section 3 describes the classification of assets for the estimation of credit 
losses, debunking some critics with regard to the possible pro-cyclicality of the standard. 
Section 4 explains how to estimate expected credit losses and some principles for 
fostering proper implementation. Section 5 concludes and suggests areas of future 
research.
1.5  STRUCTURE 
OF THE ARTICLE
FIGURE 1
LISTED
Consolidated accounts Individual accounts
NON-LISTED
Mandatory IFRS Member State discretion:
— Mandatory IFRS
— Option IFRS or National
GAAP
— Mandatory National Gaap
Member State discretion:
— Mandatory IFRS
— Option IFRS or National
Gaap
— Mandatory National Gaap
Member State discretion:
— Mandatory IFRS
— Option IFRS or National
Gaap
— Mandatory National Gaap
Spanish option for individual accounts (listed and non-listed): Mandatory National GAAP.
Spanish option for consolidated accounts (non-listed): Voluntary IFRS or National GAAP.
Comercial Code approved by Spanish Parliament.
EU ACCOUNTING ARCHITECTURE: REGULATION 1606/2002 (ART. 4 & 5)
SOURCE: Authors’ own elaboration.
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IFRS 9 contains major changes to the classification for measurement of financial assets in 
comparison with IAS 39. In these new valuation requirements, the measurement basis 
depends on the institution’s business model for managing groups of financial assets and 
the contractual cash flow characteristics of the latter. The more principles-based approach 
of IFRS 9 requires the careful use of judgment in its application, which could lead to 
discretionary application.
Therefore, financial assets must be classified in the following “portfolios”: 
– Amortised cost (AC) applies to “plain vanilla” debt instruments (e.g. loans and 
bonds) for which an entity has a business model to hold the financial asset to 
collect the contractual cash flows; to be eligible for classification in this portfolio, 
the contractual cash flows of the debt instrument must be Solely Payments of 
Principal and Interest (SPPI) on the principal amount outstanding consistent 
with a basic lending arrangement.
– Fair value through other comprehensive income (FVOCI) applies to “plain vanilla” 
(SPPI) debt instruments that are held within a business model whose objective is 
achieved by both collecting contractual cash flows and selling financial assets.
– Fair value through profit or loss (FVPL) applies to financial instruments for which 
the entity’s business model is different to those described above such as when the 
financial assets are held for trading or managed on a fair value basis.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between these different portfolios and their impairment 
model.
As reflected in the table above, impairment is recorded on traditional banking assets (loans 
and bonds) following an expected loss model according to IFRS 9 requirements. In general 
terms, the vast majority of banks’ financial assets will be subject to impairment [according 
to European Banking Authority (2018) about 80% of them are measured at amortised 
cost], to a greater or lesser extent depending on the institutions’ business model. 
This scheme is shared by the principal international standard setters (IASB and FASB), but 
with important dissimilarities that stem from the different business models of American 
and European banks. In Europe, the practice is for banks to keep originated loans on their 
books until maturity (originate-to-hold model), so their preference is for matching the cost 
of credit with the interest income over the expected life of the loan. By contrast American 
banks generally securitize and sell their originated loans in a short period of time (originate-
to-distribute model), so the FASB’s main goal is to ensure that allowances are recorded 
immediately, as pointed out by Giner and Mora (2016).
The different business models affect the share of financial assets under the impairment 
framework. More than 80% of European banks’ financial assets are measured at amortised 
cost whereas American banks maintain 60% of their assets in this portfolio, according to 
Chae et al. (2018).
Before the standard came into force, there were warnings from some quarters that, on 
first-time application a system-wide sizable increase in provisions associated with 
expected credit losses could be anticipated [see, among others, Deloitte (2016), 
Autonomous (2016), Barclays (2017) and European Banking Authority (2016 and 2017)]. 
2  Valuation of financial 
assets
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This may have undesired pro-cyclical effects via banks’ profits and regulatory capital. It is 
pertinent to note that the first two impact assessments (IA) performed by the EBA (before 
IFRS 9 came into force) were based on estimates provided by the banks themselves, 
whilst the third IA [European Banking Authority (2018)]3 is based on 2018 data reported by 
banks to competent authorities (COREP and FINREP templates) and supplemented by public 
disclosures where possible.
The fear of a deep impact has proved wrong, especially, with regard to the increase in 
“provisions”, as indicated in Figure 3. According to the European Banking Authority (2018) 
3 For European Banking Authority (2017) and European Banking AuthorityA (2018), we have taken into account the 
results shown by IRB entities in order to facilitate comparison with the rest of the surveys where the sample 
included mainly IRB banks. 
SOURCE: Authors’ own elaboration.
FIGURE 2
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comprehensive income (FVOCI) (loans and bonds)
Financial Assets at fair value through other comprehensive 
income (FVOCI) (equity)
Financial Assets at fair value through profit and loss 
(FVPL) (bonds, equity and derivates)
Without impairment
CLASSIFICATION AND IMPAIRMENT
0
8.3
16.6
24.9
33.2
41.5
49.8
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Deloitte Autonomous EBA 1st IA Barclays EBA 2nd IA EBA 3rd IA
INCREASE IN “PROVISIONS” IMPACT ON CET-1 (right-hand scale)
IFRS 9 FIRST IMPACT FIGURE 3
SOURCE: Author's own elaboration.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 154 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 36
the increase in “provisions” as at day-one (1 January 2018) was on simple average 11%.4 
The reported negative day-one impact on CET-1 was on simple average 19 bps, in this 
case, lower than the EBA 2nd IA (2017) of 32 bps.5
Another argument that reinforces our message lies in the use of the transitional 
arrangements issued under Article 473 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR). Many credit institutions 
have not resorted to using the CRR transitional arrangements concerning IFRS 9 
impairment. Specifically, the majority of large institutions – in the EBA sample (57%) – are 
not using transitional arrangements [EBA 3rd IA (2018)].
As pointed out by Giner and Mora (2016), there were differences during the drafting period 
between the principal accounting regulators (IASB and FASB), in line with those discussed 
in Section 2.2. The IASB insisted on the importance of reflecting the relationship between 
pricing and expected credit losses, while the FASB focused on developing a high level of 
allowances for expected losses, which is more aligned with the objectives of prudential 
supervisors. 
Figure 4 provides a brief explanation of impairment recognition under IFRS 9 for credit 
losses and interest revenue on financial assets depending on their credit risk.
For these purposes, financial assets are allocated to three credit risk categories that are 
widely known as “stages” (although this term is not used in the standard).6 Depending on 
the stage to which transactions are allocated, credit losses and interest income are 
calculated differently:
– “Stage 1”. At origination, institutions shall recognize – for all exposures – a loss 
allowance for an amount equal to 12-month expected credit losses (12-month 
ECL). This applies to financial assets without a significant increase in credit risk 
since initial recognition or that have low credit risk at the balance sheet date. 
The 12-month ECL are the estimated cash shortfalls during the life of the 
exposure derived from default events which may occur in the 12 months 
following the balance sheet date. That is, the 12-month ECL is the product 
resulting from multiplying the probability of default over a 12-month horizon by 
the severity of the loss in default. The 12-month ECL are defined as the future 
losses associated with the probability of default in the next 12 months (not the 
cash shortfalls expected in the next 12 months). Interest revenues are accrued 
over the gross carrying amount of the exposure.
– “Stage 2”. This is when there is a significant increase in the credit risk (SICR) of 
the exposure but default has not yet occurred. Examples of events that indicate 
a SICR could be significant are negative changes in: i) internal credit risk 
indicators (e.g. “scoring”), ii) external credit risk indicators (“rating”), iii) the 
probability of default; furthermore, the existence of amounts past-due shall be 
a backstop (rebuttable presumption) for classification under stage 2. In these 
cases, institutions recognize a loss allowance at an amount equal to lifetime 
4 In European Banking Authority (2018) the simple average for all the banks in the sample was 9%, while the 
negative impact on CET-1 for all the banks in the sample was 47 bps. 
5 In European Banking Authority (2017), the negative impact on CET-1 for all the banks in the sample was 42 bps.
6 Together with this general approach that requires the allocation in “stages”, IFRS 9 also incorporates a specific 
approach for Purchased or Originated Credit Impaired (POCIs) financial assets. 
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expected credit losses. This amount should include the estimated cash 
shortfalls during the life of the exposure derived from default events which may 
occur over its residual life until maturity. That is, the Lifetime ECL is the product 
resulting from multiplying the probability of default over a horizon equal to the 
life of the exposure by the severity of the loss in default. Interest revenues are 
accrued over the gross carrying amount of the exposure.
– “Stage 3”. When a default event occurs, institutions shall recognize a loss 
allowance for the amount of the estimated cash shortfalls during the life of the 
exposure. That is, in these cases the Lifetime ECL is equal to the severity of the loss 
in default. Interest revenues are accrued over the (net) carrying amount (that is, 
the gross carrying amount minus the loss allowance) of the exposure.
As Bellini (2019) mentions, the definition of significant increase in credit risk since initial 
recognition plays a key role throughout the entire IFRS 9 process. SICR is the trigger on 
which the impairment recognition pivots and the event that allows a leap from the twelve-
month expected credit loss to the lifetime expected credit loss. It is of vital importance that 
the institutions develop consistent policies in the recognition of the events, which give rise 
to both the significant increase of credit risk and the default. These events may include 
quantitative and qualitative indicators.
Meanwhile, generally in the context of Spanish individual financial statements, Annex 9 
goes beyond IFRS 9 in the development of credit risk categorization and, under the umbrella 
of the international standard, includes more detailed factors for classification into and out of the 
different stages. Some of these factors have been developed with regard to the EBA definitions 
for supervisory reporting aims (forborne and non-performing exposures). These definitions are 
also used by the ECB and the EBA in their supervisory analysis.
To ensure that IFRS 9 is properly implemented, Annex 9 defines modifications under 
financial difficulties of the debtors and credit impaired financial assets based on the EBA 
definitions of forborne and non-performing exposures. The intention is to achieve a timely 
classification (e.g. forborne exposures must be classified under either stage 2 or stage 3, 
but never under stage 1). To apply Annex 9 correctly, it is necessary to respect the “cure” 
3.2  IMPLEMENTATION IN SPAIN. 
ANNEX 9
FIGURE 4
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3
Impairment 
recognition
12 month expected 
credit losses
Interest revenue
Lifetime expected
credit losses
Lifetime expected
credit losses
Effective interest rate
on gross carrying 
amount
Effective interest rate
on gross carrying 
amount
Effective interest rate
on amortised cost
IMPAIRMENT AND INTEREST ACCRUAL
Purchased or originated credit impaired financial assets: entities shall recognise as impairment cumulative 
charges in lifetime expected credit losses since initial recognition. Interest accrual with credit-adjusted 
effective interest rate to the amortised cost on gross carrying amount.
SOURCE: Authors’ own elaboration.
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and “probation” periods established for forborne exposures (illustrated in the figure below), 
which specify the period of time required to confirm an improvement in the payment 
behavior of a borrower who has experienced financial difficulties.
With these definitions, Annex 9 seeks a consistent and uniform implementation within the 
expected loss model framework at all the institutions and an alignment with supervisory 
definitions that pursue simplification and a lower risk of material misstatements.
A frequent criticism of IFRS 9, among others by Sánchez Serrano (2018), is that this 
standard is not going to be applied with perfect foresight but, on the contrary, expected 
credit loss models would be able to anticipate downturns in the economic cycle only 
shortly before they occur. To clarify how IFRS 9 works, it is necessary to make clear that in 
order to move assets from stage 1 to stage 2 is not required to anticipate downturns but 
to identify assets whose credit risk premium is mispriced because their credit risk has 
significantly increased since origination.
3.3  IDENTIFICATION OF 
SIGNIFICANT INCREASES 
IN CREDIT RISK
FORBORNE EXPOSURES FIGURE 5
2nd Forbearance 
measures or past due > 
Performing
Performing forborne
Performing forborne
Non performing
Performing forborne 
(“stage 2”)
Non performing
(“stage 3”)
— Cure period minimum 1 year
— Regular payments in due time
reducing principal
— Repayments of amounts
previously past due / written-off
or alternative objective criteria
— No other transaction same
debtor past due > 90 days
1st 
forbearance
measures
Rebuttable presumptions classification as non-
performing
— Inadequate payment plan
— Contractual terms that delay payments blurring
assessments (e.g. grace period > 2 years)
— Amounts forgiven or written-off superior to
“provisions” similar exposures
Performing (“stage 1”)Performing forborne (“stage 2”)
— Probation perior minimun 2 years
— Regular payments in due time reducing principal
— Repayments of amounts previously past-due /
written-off or alternative objective criteria
— No other transactions same debtor past due
> 30 days
Forbearance measures
From Non-performing
to Performing forborne
From Performing 
forborne to Performing
SOURCE: Authors’ own elaboration.
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Thus, proper implementation of IFRS 9 does not require anticipating downturns, a task in 
which economists and macro-prudential supervisors have had few (dismal) successes. 
However, it does require measuring assets’ credit risk to identify those with currently 
mispriced credit risk premia. Credit institutions are in a better position to successfully 
complete this latter task. In practice, stage 2 assets are identified by using indicators of 
significant increases in credit risk and backstops (e.g. amount more than 30 days past 
due, forbearance granted), as discussed above.
It should be acknowledged that the “cliff effect” when moving to stage 3 is much greater 
than when moving from stage 1 to stage 2. The “cliff effect” when moving to default status 
leads to “repressed” cyclicality under the IAS 39 incurred loss model (which was released 
during the financial crisis with devastating effects on the real economy).
In comparison with stage 2, the expected credit losses to be recognized in stage 3 would be 
larger because, in stage 3, accounting default has already occurred (risk of default equals 1) 
whereas, in stage 2, the transaction has not defaulted yet (risk of default lower than 1). 
Figure 6 shows how the gross carrying amount of the loan –  used theoretically as an 
example – begins at the same level at origination and ends at the same level after the 
default event has arisen under both IAS 39 and IFRS 9. However, under IFRS 9, this 
movement is divided into several stages, depending on the credit quality of the transaction, 
which anticipates the impact of the credit losses on the statement and allows for a more 
accurate valuation. This would reduce the likelihood of recording an abrupt impact on 
profit or loss just when a downturn arises that further worsens the situation of the entity.
SOURCE: Authors’ own elaboration. 
FIGURE 6CARRYING AMOUNT OF THE FINANCIAL ASSETS. IAS 39 VS IFRS 9
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In accordance with the results shown in European Banking Authority (2018), the increase in 
provisions is mainly linked to performing financial assets (basically stage 1 and stage 2 assets) 
for which provisions increased by up to 94% (on simple average); on the other hand, the 
provisions of stage 3 assets showed an almost zero increase (on simple average). Furthermore, 
as illustrated in the figure below, the level of provisions for performing assets is higher under 
IFRS 9 than it was in previous years under IAS 39 and the institutions with lower provisioning 
levels have increased them. In general terms, institutions record more provisions, earlier and 
slightly more homogenously under IFRS 9 – as seen in Figure 77 – in comparison with IAS 39, 
under which the provisions for performing assets were very low at some institutions.
The three-stage approach of IFRS 9 seeks to balance, on the one hand, maintaining the link 
between the recognition of interest income and the level of credit losses (stage 1) and, on the 
other, the recognition of higher levels of credit losses when there is a signal that the credit 
risk premium has been significantly underestimated at origination (stage 2 and stage 3).
For stage 1 assets, the interest income recognized in the statement of profit or loss is the 
product resulting from multiplying the gross carrying amount (before deducting 
accumulated credit losses) by the effective interest rate (that is calculated at origination 
taking into account the contractual cash flows of the transaction). As a result, during a 
given financial year, there is a certain correlation between the credit risk premium 
recognized as a part of the interest income calculated using the effective interest rate and 
credit losses (“12-month ECL”). For stage 2 assets, as they are mispriced (because credit 
risk has increased significantly since origination), the interest income recognized does not 
7 The sample used for this figure comprises the 14 largest European banks with data reported in 2018 Q3. Even 
though the sample covers a large percentage of Total Assets in the European financial system, the results cannot 
be interpreted in a general way and should be taken with caution.
3.4  IMPAIRMENT RECOGNITION 
AND INTEREST ACCRUAL
SOURCE: Authors’ own elaboration.
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change but the level of credit losses increases (“Lifetime ECL”). Stage 3 assets are not 
only mispriced but also defaulted and, consequently, they require bigger allowances and 
the interest income is reduced.
This link between the recognition of interest income and the level of credit losses is severed 
in the FASB standard, as discussed above.
For the estimation of expected credit losses, IFRS 9 requires credit institutions to reflect a 
broad range of relevant information, including historical, current and forward-looking 
information. It also requires that the outcome shall be neither an estimate of a worst-case 
scenario nor an estimate of the best-case scenario. 
To implement the requirements, banks typically consider different macroeconomic 
scenarios, which are weighted in terms of the related probabilities. In any case, IASB staff 
have clarified graphically that IFRS 9 does not require either that you must use multiple 
scenarios or that you must use three scenarios; in fact, the “key message” from IASB staff 
is that you should “consider” multiple scenarios but may not always have to “use” them 
[IFRS Foundation (2016)]. 
Under IFRS 9, credit losses are assessed either individually or collectively. Annex 9 provides 
criteria to decide whether credit losses are to be determined by individual estimations (that 
require analytical information to be factored in) or by collective estimations (using statistical 
models). Individual estimations are performed using present value techniques in which the 
idiosyncratic cash flows of the transaction are discounted at its effective interest rate (EIR); 
whereas collective estimations are done using statistical parameters (often PD/LGD models) 
calculated using the cash flows of a homogenous group of transactions. In Annex 9, 
individual estimations are required where the transaction has unique characteristics; 
particularly, where there is an analytical signal of an increase in credit risk or a default event, 
as well as when there are not enough data for modelling statistical parameters. 
In the application of the principle of proportionality, Annex 9 provides statistical risk 
parameters (so-called “alternative solutions”) that could be used for collective estimations 
of credit losses for transactions booked in Spain. “Alternative solutions” are used typically 
by smaller or less complex institutions to overcome the challenges associated with the 
implementation of IFRS 9. Both European Banking Authority (2017) and European Central 
Bank (2017) highlighted that smaller credit institutions found it more challenging to make 
progress in the implementation of IFRS 9; Annex 9 helps these institutions to overcome 
these challenges by providing a “ready-to-use” model for the collective estimation of credit 
losses. “Alternative solutions” could also serve as benchmarks for credit losses of transactions 
in Spain estimated collectively using internal methodologies. 
Annex 9 provides collateral valuation criteria for the estimation of credit losses establishing 
the frequency with which the collateral should be re-valued and the techniques eligible for 
valuing it. For real estate collateral, the eligible techniques are full appraisals and Automated 
Valuation Methods (AVM) that consider the specific characteristics of the property. The 
guiding principle behind the Annex 9 criteria is that more full (and more frequent) appraisals 
are required for transactions with lower credit quality. 
Furthermore, Annex 9 provides a framework for developing benchmarking (comparison of 
an institution’s own estimations with those of its peer group) and backtesting practices 
(comparison between estimated and actual losses).
4  Methodologies for the 
estimation of credit 
losses
4.1  MODELLING EXPECTED 
CREDIT LOSSES
4.2 ANNEX 9: A LEAP FORWARD
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Forward-looking information is a type of information to be considered in the estimation 
process. Naturally, it is neither the sole nor the most significant input. Rather, for the 
incorporation of forward-looking information, an approach should be followed in which 
historical information is adjusted using macroeconomic forecasts. 
In collective estimations, the incorporation of forecasts of macroeconomic variables could 
contribute to mitigating the pro-cyclical effects observed in the risk parameters (e.g. PD/
LGD) calculated using statistical models (they are bigger in the worst part of the economic 
cycle) by taking into account the upswing in future periods.
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that the estimation of credit losses under IFRS 9 
is not only a statistical exercise but also an analytical one. In the individual estimations the 
assessment of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the transaction or the debtor is 
determinant for the outcome and decreases the degree of dependence on the evolution of 
the economy. For instance, the PD or the probability of cure in individual estimations could 
be calculated following a Bayesian approach in which the prior PD or probability of cure 
based on historical information is adjusted using current information (a new indicator of 
credit risk) that is not linked to changes in the economic cycle.
After analyzing the estimation of credit losses under both IFRS 9 and Annex 9, it is 
appropriate to state that the application of both standards requires the use of judgment in 
the expected loss assessment process. This could potentially affect its consistent 
application across institutions, which could result in a lack of comparability of their financial 
statements. Therefore, as the European Banking Authority (2017) noted, the existence of 
supervisory guidance emphasizes the importance of the high quality, robust and consistent 
application of IFRS 9, and may help to promote consistent policies and practices.
In line with Barth and Landsman (2010), the extent to which loan loss provisioning is pro-
cyclical, natural or amplified, and provides useful information will depend on how provisions 
are determined in practice, and not only on the content of the standard.
According to Bholat et al. (2018), it is poor lending, rather than accounting or reporting, 
that causes financial crises. They insist on the idea that the timely recognition of problem 
loans and credit losses in conjunction with proper transparency is critical to averting and 
mitigating crises. Therefore, the design of early warning systems in the shape of an 
adequate recognition of expected losses in good times is generally agreed by policymakers 
to contribute to greater bank resilience and to mitigate the impact of crises. For their part, 
Bushman and Williams (2012) report that discretionary provisioning in the form of earnings 
smoothing dampens disciplinary pressure on risk-taking, reduces bank transparency and 
inhibits monitoring by outsiders. 
These authors comment that discretion over credit loss provisioning can have real beneficial 
or negative consequences for the discipline of bank risk-taking, depending specifically on 
how managers exploit available discretion to shape credit loss provisions. Once again, the 
term “discretion” per se does not necessary imply negative consequences. While discretionary 
smoothing via loan loss provisions (implicit forward-lookingness) dampens discipline over 
bank risk-taking, explicit forward-lookingness that captures the extent to which current 
provisions anticipate future deteriorations in the loan portfolio enhances discipline.
Proper implementation necessarily includes actions at different levels, as shown in 
Figure 8. 
4.3  FORWARD-LOOKING 
INFORMATION
4.4  PROPER IMPLEMENTATION 
IS THE KEY
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First, prior to the application of the standard, institutions will have had to enhance 
governance of the process, including comprehensive monitoring with the participation of 
the internal audit department. One of the keys to reducing future shocks when turbulence 
arises is to establish solid procedures and criteria for loan origination. A relaxation of credit 
standards during upswings leads to the recognition of greater losses during recessions 
[among others, Jiménez and Saurina (2005), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and Porcuna 
(2018)]. It is also of capital importance to enhance data quality, as this is one of the biggest 
challenges in the implementation of IFRS 9 [Deloitte (2018)]. These procedures and criteria 
must be consistent with the institution’s risk appetite. 
Second, once the standard has been applied, as we have commented throughout the 
article, it should be acknowledged that it is based on principles which have to be applied 
consistently. An adequate classification of the portfolios, according to the bank business 
model, shall contribute to a more accurate valuation. In this context, a timely categorization 
of the assets based on their credit risk (the so-called “staging”) and a robust valuation of 
the expected credit losses shall help to avoid undue abrupt impacts on the financial 
statements. It is also crucial to properly assess collateral value to avoid future surprises. 
Lastly, benchmarking exercises shall compare practices at different institutions across the 
whole market, in order to identify outlying practices, while the backtesting analysis helps 
boost confidence in the process and in the reliability of the estimates.
The third element is enforcement. We believe that the expected loss model shall be 
appropriately enforced within the banking industry. In this regard, further work is still 
needed to increase the consistency of outcomes through benchmarking exercises as 
well as to guide the institutions’ backtesting of estimated losses compared with actual 
losses.
The effectiveness of the new standards will depend not only on how banks implement 
them, but also on the contributions of enforcers and other stakeholders, as stated by 
Cohen and Edwards (2017).
SOURCE: Authors’ own elaboration.
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As for the auditors, Bouvatier, Lepetit, and Strober (2014) found a negative relationship 
between the quality of their work and the income smoothing practices on loan loss 
provisioning. This result suggests that auditors can avoid discretionary practices and 
reduce management bias in the estimations. In this regard, the international audit standard 
setter (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board –  IAASB  –) has recently 
revised its standard on the audit of accounting estimates (ISA 540), principally induced by 
the change in the credit loss provisioning model.
The recent paper by Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2018) which examines the role of 
supervisors in the financial reporting quality of banks is very interesting. They mention 
some previous studies [see Costello et al. (2016), Bischof et al. (2016) and Nicoletti (2017)], 
who describe the benefits of supervisory intervention for financial reporting transparency, 
and the association between regulatory leniency and the lower likelihood of income-
decreasing restatements. Furthermore, most significantly, Nicoletti (2017) finds that 
supervisory scrutiny and external audits are positively associated with credit loss provision 
timeliness. The last finding bolsters our previous idea of the need for cooperation between 
auditors, enforcers and other stakeholders to strengthen the enforcement in respect of 
banks’ accounting practices. 
Naturally, a homogeneous application of these measures across the different jurisdictions 
shall be essential to ensure a level playing field. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2018) 
highlight the importance of the recent efforts of supranational banking organizations (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and EBA) to ensure consistent practices in the 
implementation of the newly introduced expected loss approach under IFRS 9.
The Great Financial Crisis changed the way credit institutions should estimate their 
provisions for financial assets. Thus, IFRS 9 supersedes IAS 39 by introducing some 
relevant changes which have made the headlines in financial sector regulation in recent 
years. A model based on incurred losses (IAS 39) has given way to a model based on 
expected losses (IFRS 9).
IFRS 9 requires a more timely and gradual recognition of credit losses, it promotes the 
early recognition of credit losses and contributes to improved credit quality control 
systems. It avoids the “false” stability and the negative effects of the constrained credit 
losses abruptly released under the IAS 39 incurred loss model when economic turmoil is 
acknowledged.
IFRS 9 reduces divergence in accounting practices in comparison with IAS 39, with regard 
to the methodologies for the estimation of credit losses in performing exposures. The more 
structured scheme with three “stages” allows more homogeneity and comparability in the 
standard application of IFRS 9 because it provides a clearer framework for the provisioning 
of exposures that are not in default (stage 3). IFRS 9 requires the recognition of 12-month 
expected credit losses from loan origination (stage 1 exposures) and introduces the need 
for lifetime expected credit losses when a significant increase in credit risk occurs before 
the default event (stage 2 exposures).
Classification of financial assets for the estimation of provisions pivots on the identification 
of significant increases in credit risk at the level of the exposure since its origination. 
Therefore, for a timely classification by stages is not necessary anticipating economic 
downturns. Contrary to the opinion of certain critics of IFRS 9, perfect foresight of future 
economic conditions can contribute positively to – but is not a prerequisite for – the proper 
5  Conclusions and future 
research
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implementation of IFRS 9. What is required is an assessment of the credit risk at the level 
of the exposure, such as monitoring changes in PDs, credit ratings, credit scoring, days 
past due or whether forbearance has been granted. Credit institutions which function 
properly should be able to perform this kind of monitoring. 
The timely identification of stage 2 assets (with significant increases in credit risk but not 
in accounting default) helps to avoid giving a false impression of stability which is then 
followed by the sudden recognition of credit losses in downturns that abruptly impacts the 
statement of profit or loss and complicates an already difficult situation. 
The scarce data available confirm the conceptual insights mentioned above. Under IFRS 9, 
the overall level of provisions of large EU credit institutions has increased significantly 
(11% on average), the level of provisions for performing exposures (mainly stage 1 and 2 
assets) has almost doubled on average and the institutions with lower levels of provisions 
for performing exposures have increased them. 
To take advantage of the IFRS 9 expected loss model, and complying with this standard, 
Annex 9 of Circular 04/2017 of Banco de España includes: i) definitions of modifications 
under financial difficulties and credit-impaired exposures, following EBA definitions of 
forborne and non-performing exposures, to increase comparability and to contribute to a 
timely classification (e.g. forborne exposures shall be classified in stage 2 during the 
“probation” period); ii) in the application of the principle of proportionality, risk parameters 
(so-called “alternative solutions”) that could be used by typically small or less complex 
institutions for collective estimations to overcome the challenges of developing IFRS 9 
models; iii) a framework for developing benchmarking and backtesting practices; as well 
as iv) collateral valuation criteria for the estimation of credit losses.
The merits of an accounting standard should be assessed in terms of proper implementation 
and whether such implementation is feasible for the institutions. In this regard, as a result 
of IFRS 9 and Annex 9, the estimation of credit losses is better integrated into management 
as now the involvement of different areas and levels within credit institutions’ structures is 
required.
Implementing IFRS 9 properly is essential and helps to avoid inefficiencies and undesired 
effects. The expected loss model allows greater subjectivity in its application but precisely 
this subjectivity may prevent credit loss estimations from being pro-cyclical without giving 
room for earning management. The expert judgment required in the individual estimations 
of provisions or in the consideration of forward-looking information may decrease the 
extent to which the estimations are dependent on changes in the economic cycle.
Further work is still needed from preparers, auditors, regulators and supervisors to increase 
the consistency of the outcomes of the IFRS 9 estimation of credit losses across institutions 
because significant steps of this iterative process depend on subjective assessments. The 
more stakeholders focus on the proper application of IFRS 9, the greater the benefit for the 
financial system in general. Possible avenues for achieving this are benchmarking exercises 
as well as guiding the institutions’ backtesting of estimated losses against actual losses.
As more data become available, it will be very interesting to analyze further how institutions 
are implementing the standard. For this purpose, it will be essential to observe how the 
factors for the identification of significant increases in credit risk are used (stage 2 
classification). 
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